New Report on A-10 vs F-35 Close Air Support Flyoff Revealed

New Report on A-10 vs F-35 Close Air Support Flyoff Revealed

The highly anticipated report on the controversial flyoff between the A-10C Warthog and F-35A Joint Strike Fighter has finally been declassified and released. The report, which was completed last year but kept under wraps until now, raises more questions than answers. However, it does provide valuable information that has not been made public before.

The report was obtained by the Project on Government Oversight (POGO), an independent nonprofit, through the Freedom of Information Act. It was produced by the Pentagon’s Office of the Director of Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) and is dated February 2022. The flyoff, which took place from April 2018 to March 2019, was conducted to meet a demand from Congress included in the 2017 Fiscal Year defense policy bill.

One of the main mysteries of the report is why it took nearly three years to complete and why its findings were never announced publicly or distributed to military communities. Very few people had seen any part of the document prior to its release, and it was not shared with members of the A-10 or F-35 communities.

The report provides an overview of how the flyoff was planned and conducted. The Joint Strike Fighter Operational Test Team (JOTT) led the testing, which was part of the larger F-35 Initial Operational Test and Evaluation (IOT&E) process. The test sorties were staged from Edwards Air Force Base in California and conducted mock missions over ranges at Naval Air Weapons Station China Lake and Yuma Proving Ground.

The flyoff focused on three mission sets: close air support (CAS), airborne forward air control (FAC[A]), and combat search and rescue (CSAR). The report evaluated the A-10 and F-35’s performance in each mission set based on various factors, including targeting time, engagement time, brief generation time, correlation time, coordination time, and recovery time.

The testing simulated both low-threat “permissive” and medium-threat “contested” environments, but high-threat missions were not included in the comparison test. The report does not provide detailed information on the types of threats presented during the test sorties.

During the flyoff, A-10s and F-35s flew a total of 117.5 flight hours across 69 sorties. The report does not definitively state which aircraft performed better in the three mission sets or in permissive versus contested environments. However, it does mention that more F-35 sorties would be needed to achieve the same number of targets in permissive environments due to the A-10’s larger payload capacity.

The report acknowledges limitations in the testing, including deviations from the approved test plan and a lack of specialized training requirements for F-35 pilots in CAS, FAC(A), and CSAR missions. Despite these limitations, the report claims that the data collected are sufficient to inform the conclusions and fulfill the requirements of the National Defense Authorization Act.

Overall, the declassified report on the A-10C Warthog and F-35A Joint Strike Fighter flyoff raises more questions than it answers. While it provides valuable details that were previously undisclosed, it leaves many aspects of the comparison test unresolved. As the U.S. Air Force plans to retire the Warthogs by the end of the decade, the future role of close air support remains a topic of debate.