The founder of the People’s Republic of China, Mao Zedong, once said that guerrillas must blend in with the people, much like a fish swimming in the sea. This lesson has been heeded by various terrorist and revolutionary groups, including Hamas in Gaza.
While there has been intense fighting in Gaza, with documented civilian casualties and losses on both sides, it is notable that there have been few verifiable casualties from Hamas. The Israeli military claims to have diminished the effectiveness of 10 out of Hamas’ 24 battalions and killed hundreds of fighters. However, the exact number of fighters in a Hamas battalion is uncertain, as irregular and terrorist groups typically have fewer fighters compared to Israeli or Western military groups.
The IDF estimates that before October 7, Hamas had around 30,000 fighters in Gaza, organized into five regional brigades and 140 companies. Each brigade is equipped with rockets, anti-tank missiles, sniper teams, and engineering teams. Despite the IDF’s firepower and the time Hamas has had to prepare, the lack of direct military action from Hamas suggests that the fight in Gaza is different from recent major urban combat situations against groups like the Islamic State.
One possible explanation is that Hamas fighters are biding their time, similar to the Taliban in Afghanistan who resorted to farming when outnumbered. Many Hamas fighters may have escaped through the extensive network of tunnels known as the Gaza Metro, which provides them with a means to retreat and stockpile weapons, food, water, and fuel. Israel is attempting to dismantle these tunnels section by section, but it is unlikely to eradicate the entire network.
Another possibility is that Hamas fighters have used the tunnels to escape to the south of Gaza along with civilians fleeing Israeli bombardment in the north. Israel has tried to profile those evacuating to identify potential Hamas fighters, but searching and questioning every fighting-age male in a population of over two million is not feasible.
Israel’s strategy may involve intercepting communications between Hamas leaders and foot soldiers to identify and target important individuals. However, this approach would be a long-term effort and may not deliver the desired results to reassure the Israeli society.
Meanwhile, Israeli troops have made significant progress into the north of the Gaza Strip, capturing important buildings and facilities. However, there is little evidence of significant Hamas presence in these captured areas.
Counterinsurgency campaigns, aimed at defeating an idea rather than just an armed faction, require a high ratio of security forces to the population. In the case of Gaza, Hamas may choose to remain hidden, losing ground and equipment but not fighters. This could make it challenging for Israel to either wait for Hamas to reveal themselves or find them.
Overall, the situation in Gaza remains complex, and the outcome of the conflict is uncertain.
